We have a Problem
...with DRE Voting Machines!
Voting
machines are in the news because the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA)
offered the states billions of dollars to replace lever-type and punched-card voting
equipment with new systems. Many states are buying "Direct Recording
Electronic" voting systems, called DREs or
touch-screens.
DREs typically resemble PCs with touch-screen
capability and a few buttons instead of a keyboard. Voters with disabilities
like the fact that the computer can be connected to assistive devices that
allow them to vote without help from other people. However, many voters
(including many with disabilities) don't trust DREs
that lack the capacity for independent audit. In fact, computer scientists
warned Congress before HAVA passed that computer technology by itself, without
the capacity for independent audit, is NOT secure and should not be used.
Using
technology that exists today, an independent audit of DRE voting systems requires
a printout of each voter's ballot that can be verified before the voter leaves
the booth. This is called a voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT). After the
voter checks the printout for accuracy, it goes into a locked ballot box. After
the election, an independent audit of electronic tallies can be made by
independently counting the voter-verified paper ballots, or by performing an
ordinary reconciliation between electronically recorded and paper
ballots--similar to what businesses do with their daily transaction records.
Assistive
devices that enable individuals with disabilities to work with information on
computer screens and paper printouts have been in use for decades. Such devices
should be attached to DRE voting systems so voters with disabilities can enter
their ballot choices and verify their ballot printout.
Paper
receipts are printed at low cost and high reliability from cash registers,
ATMs, gas pumps, etc. Yet, most DREs on the market
today do not provide a voter-verified paper trail--and the spurious arguments
against them are high cost and low reliability.
In
fact, many DREs already have printers, but the major
manufacturers have designed their systems to make printouts only after the election is over. At that
time, they can print complete marked ballots from computer memory, and a log of
the day's events (called an audit trail).
But
something that's printed after the election is over can't provide security,
because the voter is no longer present to confirm that the printout is correct.
Unless the voting system programmers are completely incompetent, all printouts
at the end of the day will agree with the system's final vote tallies--whether
those tallies are correct or wrong.
Computer security means
more than safety from hackers. It means the results of normal operation can be
proven correct by independent audit. This simple concept is recognized in business,
industry, and government, where transaction-capturing and -processing computer
systems are audited continuously. No one "trusts" a computer--we
audit the computer's work, and we trust the audit. Electronic voting systems
without VVPAT have been designed to prevent audits that are
universally-accepted standard practice.
Lack
of an independent audit prevents people from detecting and correcting both
innocent and malicious errors, as well as hacking attacks. As a result, voters
must accept election tallies for which there is no possibility of independent
recount or confirmation. This is true even after malfunctions, crashes, lost
ballots, vote-transfers from one candidate to another visible on the screen,
machines that won't register votes for some candidates or fail to show some
races, etc.
We have Solutions
DREs:
We can confirm the accuracy of computer-generated vote tallies by comparing
them to independently-counted tallies of voter-verified paper ballots that have
been stored securely until the recount. Independent counting can be done by
hand and/or optical scanner. Some new systems in development now, such as by
the Open Voting Consortium, will allow us to perform a
standard business-style reconciliation between electronically recorded
and paper ballots--similar to what businesses do with their daily transaction
records.
Ballot-Marking
Machines: We don't need DREs! Computerized ballot-marking machines with assistive
attachments can allow all voters, including those with disabilities, to vote on
the same paper ballots. Able voters can choose to mark their ballots by machine
or by pencil. All ballots, including absentee and provisional ballots, can be
the same, simplifying the counting procedures. Counting can be done by hand or
optical scanner. For more info:
http://www.eff.org/e-vote/e-vote_white_paper_20040517.pdf
5 Points. (1) If we are forced to use computers in vote
recording and counting, these computers must give us at least the same level of
security (verifiable accuracy) and reliable ease-of-use that we get from
computerized cash registers in our local supermarket. (2) Computer accuracy is not "free"
-- it is achieved by continuous audits and reconciliations, and if those are
not done the computer's work cannot be assumed to be accurate. (3) If we are serious about our democracy,
all voters need to consider the needs and inclusion of all voters--including
the disabled, language and racial minorities, and other historically
disenfranchised communities. (4) Whatever voting and vote-counting methodology
we use, it should not arouse the massive outcry, controversy, and lack of voter
confidence that unverifiable electronic voting systems have generated.
(5) People must work together to ensure integrity
and voter confidence in our elections this year. Our goal is attainable if we
use our American ingenuity, know-how, and can-do attitudes.
Privatization of Elections
versus Funding for Training. Few Boards of Election have the in-house
expertise to evaluate or manage secure computer systems, or even to notice if a
security breach has occurred. News reports of problems with this equipment
consistently reveal the dependency of Boards of Election on vendors' service
contracts and technicians. To avoid privatization, computer training must be
funded and required for election officials and staff in any jurisdiction where
computers are to be used to record and count votes. Many voters are calling for
use of paper absentee ballots in November 2004 to avoid a suspect election, and
for people to have to do that is a disgrace to our great nation.
Too much trouble? Elections have had low
cultural and fiscal priority for a long time. Now we hear some election
directors are saying they can't possibly count paper ballots by hand or by
optical scanner! It is every citizen's fault if our Boards of Election lack
resources. Is democracy just too much trouble? We disagree! We call upon all
Americans to support verifiable elections!
Unverifiable elections are an insult to a democracy!
More info: www.VerifiedVoting.org www.notablesoftware.com/evote.html
_______________________www.VotersUnite.org www.BlackBoxVoting.com _________
contact: Teresa Hommel,
www.WheresThePaper.org
admin@wheresthepaper.org